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Does the Steindl-Dutt Investment Function Rule Out
Profit-Led Expansion?
Deepankar Basu∗
April 10, 2018

Abstract
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) had argued that an investment function which has the
profit rate and the capacity utilization rates as the two determinants of investment
imposes unwarranted restrictions on the macroeconomic model and rules out profit-led
expansion. In this paper, I show that this critique only holds in a closed economy
model. In an open economy model, such an investment function does not rule out
profit-led expansion. I argue that the problem was less in the investment function
itself than in the larger model within which it was embedded, in particular the saving
behavior of the macroeconomy entailed by the model.
Keywords: structuralist model; investment function; profit-led expansion.
JEL Codes: E12; B51.
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Introduction

One of the key features that distinguishes structuralist from neoclassical approaches to
macroeconomics is the role that the former accords to independent investment functions.
The structuralist position derives from the understanding that saving and investment decisions are not coterminous. In fact, different economic agents make those decisions, and
there is only a partial overlap in those decision making processes. Hence, an independent
investment function should be an essential component of any macroeconomic model of the
capitalist economy.1
A popular version of an investment function that was used in the heterodox macroeconomic literature until the 1980s was what Basu and Das (2016) have called the Steindl-Dutt
investment function, where investment is specified to be a function of the profit rate and the
∗
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capacity utilization rate (Rowthorn, 1981; Taylor, 1983; Dutt, 1984). In their seminal paper,
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) offered a critique of this investment function arguing that such
a specification imposes unwarranted restrictions on the responsiveness of investment to the
two components of profit rate - the capacity utilization rate and the profit share. The problem is that such a restriction rules out a profit-led expansion, i.e. where a shift in income
away from wages leads to a rise in capacity utilization and the growth rate of the capital
stock.
Observe that this influence of existing capacity on investment cannot be captured
satisfactorily by simply introducing a term for capacity utilization ... along with
the rate of profit ... as the arguments in the investment function ... The problem
with this procedure is that it imposes unwarranted restrictions on the relative
response of investment to the two constituents of the profit rate ... with the
result that the possibility of profit-led expansion is ruled out ... (Bhaduri and
Marglin, 1990, pp. 380).
Since there is no reason to rule out a profit-led regime a priori, it led to the suggestion
that the Steindl-Dutt investment function should be avoided. The force of this critique seems
to have been one of the reasons for the shift by heterodox macroeconomists to the alternative
investment function that Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) proposed. Such an investment, which
Basu and Das (2016) called the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function, uses the profit share
(instead of the profit rate) and the capacity utilization rate as determinants of investment.
This specification is now the workhorse of heterodox macroeconomics (Taylor, 2006; Blecker,
2010).
In this paper, I revisit the Bhaduri-Marglin critique of the Steindl-Dutt investment function. I illustrate the argument in a simple one sector structuralist closed economy model.
I show that the critique does not hold when the model is opened up to trade.2 Hence,
the problem of the Steindl-Dutt investment function was less in the restrictions it imposed
on the responsiveness of investment to the two components of the profit rate than in the
larger model within which it was embedded. In particular, what is crucial is the saving
behaviour associated with the macroeconomic model. As long as savings is responsive to
some exogenous parameter that also impacts income distribution, a macroeconomic model
with the Steindl-Dutt investment function does not rule out profit-led expansion. A standard one sector open economy structuralist model offers this possibility. Hence, even though
the Steindl-Dutt investment function should be avoided in closed economy models, it can be
used in structuralist models of the open economy.
Before I present the analysis of this paper, it is important to clarify what I understand
by the term ‘profit-led growth’. Much, but not all, of the contemporary heterodox macroeconomics literature has used it loosely to mean a situation where the local responsiveness of
the growth rate of the capital stock to the profit share (as a measure of income distribution
between classes) is positive. In most heterodox models, the profit share and the growth rate
are both endogenous variables. Hence, equilibrium values of both are determined jointly by
2
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the values of exogenous variables in the model. Thus, the local responsiveness of the growth
rate to the profit share is not very informative or useful as has been rightly argued by Skott
(2017).
In this paper, I avoid this problem. When I use the term ‘profit-led growth’ (or expansion)
I mean by that a situation where a change in some exogenous parameter leads to an increase
in the profit share and the growth rate. In particular, I will use changes in the mark-up rate,
which is an exogenous parameter in the model, to investigate changes in the profit share and
the growth rate. This means that, in the particular case that I will study, the ultimate cause
of changes in both the profit share and the growth rate are changes in the mark-up rate. But
it is also true that while changes in the equilibrium profit share (itself caused by changes
in the mark-up rate) is one of the mechanisms through which the equilibrium growth rate
changes, there is no reciprocal channel through which changes in the equilibrium growth
rate (itself caused by changes in some exogenous parameters) can impact the equilibrium
profit share. It is this asymmetry which might allow us to talk meaningfully of a profit-led
expansion, even when both variables are endogenous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I demonstrate the BhaduriMarglin critique of the Steindl-Dutt investment function in a simple one sector structuralist
closed economy model. In section 3, I show that the critique no longer holds in an open
economy model and highlight the key role of saving behavior in driving the result. I conclude
the paper in section 4, and in an appendix, I present the Bhaduri-Marglin argument in the
specific terms used in Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) for comparison and reference.

2

Closed Economy Model

Consider an open capitalist economy without the government sector. Production of commodities is carried out with labour, and accumulated stocks of commodities known as “capital”. Let b units of labour be required to produce 1 unit of the output. Since this is a one
sector model, the underlying assumption is that the economy produces one “good’ which
can be consumed, saved or invested.

2.1

Mark-up Pricing

The economy is characterised by the existence of excess productive capacity. Hence, the
marginal cost of production is constant. Let the nominal wage rate be w, so that the
marginal cost is given by wb. We assume that firms have monopoly power, and so their
profit-maximising behavior leads them to set prices as a mark-up over the fixed marginal
cost. Hence,
P = (1 + τ ) wb
(1)
where P is the price of the industrial commodity, and τ > 0 is the fixed mark-up rate. The
mark-up rate derives from and captures the degree of monopoly in the economy.

3

2.2

Profitability and Capacity Utilization

Let K denote fixed capital in physical terms and X denote output in physical terms. Then,
the profit rate, r, is given by
P X − wbX
.
(2)
r=
PK
A little algebraic manipulation of (1) shows that the expression for the profit rate can be
written as


τ
X
r=
.
1+τ K
As long as there is excess capacity, the ratio X/K can be used as a measure of the rate of
capacity utilization, u, i.e.,
X
u=
(3)
K
so that we get
τ
r=
u.
(4)
1+τ

2.3

Income Distribution

The distribution of income between the classes is captured by the share of profits in national
income, h. The mark-up rate, which captures the monopoly power of capitalist firms, directly
determines the share of profits as follows
τ
h=
(5)
1+τ
so that dh/dτ > 0. Thus, a rise in the mark-up rate leads to a distribution of income towards
profits.

2.4

Savings

The part of income that is not consumed is saved. Since there are two types of income
streams in the domestic economy, profits and wages, there can be domestic savings out of
either or both. But we work with the classical savings assumption that all wage income in
consumed. Hence, domestic savings comes out of profit income and is given by
sr rP K,
where sr is the average savings rate out of profit income, rP K.
Since we are considering a closed economy, domestic savings is also total savings, which
is given by
S = sr rP K
Dividing through by P K gives us the savings function normalized by the capital stock (as a
function of the rate of profit) as
S
≡ s = sr r
(6)
PK
4

2.5

Investment

Let g = P I/P K, the ratio of investment normalized by the capital stock, denote the growth
rate of the capital stock. We will use a Steindl-Dutt specification of the investment function,
where the growth rate of the capital stock is a function of the rate of profit, r, and the
capacity utilization rate, u,
P I/P K ≡ g = I(r, u).
(7)
The responsiveness of investment to changes in the profit rate, Ir (the partial derivative
of the investment function with respect to the profit rate), and to changes in the capacity
utilization rate, Iu (the partial derivative of the investment function with respect to the
capacity utilization rate), are parameters of the model, and we assume, that
Ir > 0, Iu > 0.
A linear specification of the Steindl-Dutt investment function would be the following:

z2 
r,
P I/P K ≡ g = z0 + z1 r + z2 u = z0 + z1 + z2 +
τ

(8)

(9)

where z0 , z1 , z2 > 0.

2.6

Real Wage Rate

The real wage rate, ω is given by
ω=

w
w
=
P
(1 + τ ) wb

which, simplifies to the following:
ω=

2.7

1
.
b (1 + τ )

(10)

Macroeconomic Balance

Macroeconomic balance requires the equality of demand and supply, which can be re-stated
as the requirement for the equality of saving and investment. Hence, the condition for
macroeconomic balance is
s=g
(11)
To summarize, the one sector structuralist model laid out above has 6 endogenous variables: savings (normalized by the capital stock), s, investment (normalized by the capital
stock), g, the rate of profit, r, the capacity utilization rate, u, the profit share, h, and the
real wage rate, ω. The 6 relationships among the 6 endogenous variables, captured by (4),
(5), (6), (7), (10), and (11), are impacted by the following parameters: τ, sr , Ir , Iu , b. The 6
equations can be solved to arrive at equilibrium values of the endogenous variables in terms
of the parameters.
5

2.8

Wage-Led Bias

To see that this model has a wage-led bias, and that it rules out profit-led expansion, all
we need to do is to work out the comparative statics of an exogenous parameter that can
affect the income distribution. Such a parameter, in this model, is the mark-up rate, τ ,
which captures the degree of monopoly power of firms. By (5), an increase in the mark-up
rate will lead to an increase in the profit share, i.e. a redistribution of income away from
wage incomes. Hence, a comparative static exercise of an increase in the mark-up rate would
be one of the ways in which we can investigate the possibilities of wage-led and profit-led
expansions in this model.3
To carry out the comparative statics of an increase in the mark-up rate, we do not need
to solve for the equilibrium values of all the endogenous variables. We only need to compute
the derivative of the equilibrium values of the capacity utilization rate and the growth rate
with respect to the mark-up rate, τ . Suppose r∗ and u∗ denotes the profit rate and the
capacity utilization rate in equilibrium. Then, using (11), we see that the following should
be satisfied
sr r∗ = I(r∗ , u∗ )
so that,
sr

dr∗
du∗
dr∗
= Ir
+ Iu
.
dτ
dτ
dτ

Using (4), we see that
du∗
=
dτ
so that,

dr∗
dr∗
= Ir
+ Iu
sr
dτ
dτ

Upon rearrangement, we get

where



1 dr∗ r∗
1+
− 2
τ dτ
τ


1
1+
τ



dr∗ r∗
− 2
dτ
τ

dr∗
Iu r∗
=− 2 <0
dτ
∆τ


Iu
∆ = sr − Ir + Iu +
>0
τ


.

(12)

by the Keynesian stability condition.4 Since


du∗
1 dr∗ r∗
= 1+
− 2
dτ
τ dτ
τ
3

What policies could be adopted to increase the mark-up rate? A combination of policies that includes
subsidizing profits and redistributing income away from wage earners (through reduction of direct income
transfers) would result in a rise in the mark-up rate.
4
The derivative in (12) gives us the local slope of profit rate defined as an implicit function of the
parameters, including τ , by (11), and is computed by the use of the implicit function theorem (IFT). We are
justified in using the IFT because ∆ > 0. Whenever I refer to ‘slope’ it will always mean the local slope in
the neighbourhood of the equilibrium.
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we see, using (12), that the partial effect of a change in the mark-up rate on the equilibrium
capacity utilization rate is given by


du∗
1 Iu r∗ r∗
=− 1+
−
< 0.
(13)
dτ
τ ∆τ 2 τ 2
If g ∗ denotes the growth rate of the capital stock in equilibrium, we have
dr∗
du∗
dg ∗
= Ir
+ Iu
dτ
dτ
dτ
so that, using (12) and (13), we see that
dg ∗
dr∗
du∗
= Ir
+ Iu
<0
dτ
dτ
dτ

(14)

because Ir , Iu > 0. Let us summarise the above discussion as
Claim 1. In a one sector structuralist closed economy model with a Steindl-Dutt investment
function, captured by (4), (5), (6), (7), (10), and (11), the possibility of profit-led expansion
is ruled out by construction.
Proof. This follows from an inspection of (12) and (14).
What is the intuition for Claim 1? I illustrate the argument using a linear specification
of the investment function in Figure 1. The savings function in (6) and a linear specification
of the investment function in (9) is depicted in Figure 1, where the horizontal axis measures
the rate of profit and the vertical axis measures saving and investment (both normalised by
the capital stock). The intersection of the two curves determine the equilibrium level of the
profit rate and the corresponding levels of savings and investment.5
Starting from a situation of macroeconomic balance, with the equilibrium profit rate,
r1 , when there is an increase in the mark-up rate, τ , it leads to fall in the slope of the
investment function, because the slope of the investment function is (z1 + z2 + z2 /τ ). Hence,
the investment function rotates in a clockwise direction: the investment function moves
from AB to AB 0 . This means that the amount of investment demand is lower at the original
equilibrium profit rate. But, and this is key, the savings function in (6) remains unchanged.
Hence, the only way to restore macroeconomic balance is for the economy to move to an
equilibrium with a lower profit rate, r2 , and a correspondingly lower level of investment.
That is why the economy moves to a lower growth rate in the new equilibrium: the original
equilibrium had the growth rate OF, and the new equilibrium growth rate is given by OG.
From the above analysis, it emerges that the possibility of profit-led expansion is being
ruled out not because of the Steindl-Dutt investment function in (9) but because of the
savings function in (6). For the new equilibrium to have a higher growth rate, the model
would need to allow a change in the saving schedule, either a rotation or a vertical shift or
5

I assume that z0 > 0, which ensures existence of the equilibrium, and that sr > z1 + z2 + z2 /τ , which
ensures local stability of the equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Comparative statics of an increase in the mark-up rate in a one sector closed
economy structuralist model with a linear specification of the Steindl-Dutt investment function. The savings function is given by: s(r) = sr r; the investment function is given by
g(r) = z0 + (z1 + z2 + z2 /τ ) r. The equilibrium profit rate falls from r1 to r2 and the corresponding equilibrium growth rate falls from OF to OG.
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both. But the saving function in (6) rules out both types of change. To underline this point,
I will now show that the result about the impossibility of profit-led growth no longer holds
when we work with an open economy model. This is because in the open economy, total
saving is the sum of domestic and foreign saving, and the latter allows both the slope and
the intercept of the saving schedule to be responsive to changes in the mark-up rate. This
restores the possibility of profit-led expansion.

3

Open Economy Model

Let us now open up the economy to foreign trade with all other features of the model remaining unchanged. Production of commodities is carried out with labour, imported intermediate
inputs and accumulated stocks of commodities known as “capital”. Let b units of labour and
a0 units of intermediate inputs be required, respectively, to produce 1 unit of the output.

3.1

Mark-up Pricing

Let the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of foreign currency) be e, and
the foreign currency price of the imported intermediate input be P ∗ . Then, the marginal
cost is given by wb + eP ∗ a0 . Hence,
P = (1 + τ ) (wb + eP ∗ a0 )

(15)

where P is the price of the industrial commodity, and τ > 0 is the fixed mark-up rate.

3.2

Profitability and Capacity Utilization

Let K denote fixed capital in physical terms and X denote output in physical terms. Then,
the profit rate, r, is given by
P X − wbX − eP ∗ a0 X
.
(16)
PK
A little algebraic manipulation of (16) shows that the expression for the profit rate can be
written, just as in the closed economy model, as
τ
u.
(17)
r=
1+τ
It is also worth noting that the expression for the share of profit in national income, h,
remains unchanged as a function of the mark-up rate
τ
h=
(18)
1+τ
r=

so that dh/dτ > 0 remains true. Thus, a rise in the mark-up rate, in the open economy
model, would also lead to a distribution of income towards profits. Hence, we would be
justified in carrying out the same comparative static exercise - of an increase in the mark-up
rate, as in the closed economy case.
9

3.3

Savings

Domestic savings comes out of profit income and is given by
sr rP K,
where sr is the average savings rate out of profit income, rP K.
The new and key element is foreign savings, which is equal to the trade deficit, i.e. the
difference between imports and exports. In this model, there are two types of imports:
intermediate inputs and final goods and services. On the other hand, there is only one type
of exports: final goods and services. Hence, the trade deficit is given by the difference of
intermediate imports and net exports (of final goods and services)
eP ∗ a0 X − P E
where E denotes net exports of final goods in real terms. Hence total savings, which is the
sum of domestic and foreign savings, is given by
S = eP ∗ a0 X − P E + sr rP K
Dividing through by P K gives us the savings function normalized by the capital stock (as a
function of the rate of profit) as


φ
S
≡ s = − +
+ sr r
(19)
PK
τ
where

eP ∗ a0
wb + eP ∗ a0
is the share of intermediate imported inputs in the marginal cost of production, so that
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, and
E
=
K
is net exports of final goods and services as a ratio of the capital stock.
In (19), domestic saving is given by the term sr r, and foreign saving is captured by the
term − + (φr)/τ . It is worth pointing out the crucial role of foreign savings in this analysis.
It will be recalled that the main problem in the closed economy model was that it did not
allow the slope or the intercept of the saving schedule to be responsive to changes in the
mark-up rate. With the foreign saving term in (19), the model restores that possibility. Now,
both the slope and the intercept is impacted by changes in the mark-up rate. Hence, this
creates the possibility of profit-led growth, a point that will emerge in the discussion below.
φ=

3.4

Investment

The specification of the investment function remains unchanged:
g = I(r, u), Ir > 0, Iu > 0.
10

(20)

3.5

Real Wage Rate

The real wage rate, ω is given by
w
1
w
=
=
ω=
∗
P
(1 + τ ) (wb + eP a0 )
b(1 + τ )



wb
wb + eP ∗ a0



which, using the expression for the share of imported intermediate inputs in the marginal
cost of production, φ, becomes
1−φ
ω=
(21)
b (1 + τ )

3.6

Macroeconomic Balance

The macroeconomic balance requires the equality of savings and investment:
s = g.

(22)

To summarize, the one sector structuralist open economy model has 6 endogenous variables: savings (normalized by the capital stock), s, investment (normalized by the capital
stock), g, the rate of profit, r, the capacity utilization rate, u, the profit share, h and the real
wage rate, ω. The 6 relationships among the 6 endogenous variables, captured by (17), (18),
(19), (20), (22), and (21), is impacted by the following parameters: , φ, τ, sr , Ir , Iu , b, a0 .
The 6 equations can be solved to arrive at equilibrium values of the endogenous variables in
terms of the parameters.

3.7

Possibility of Profit-Led Expansion

Just as before, we do not need to solve for the equilibrium values of all the endogenous
variables. All we need to do is to compute derivatives of the equilibrium values of the
capacity utilization rate and the growth rate with respect to the mark-up rate, τ . Suppose,
as before, r∗ and u∗ denotes the profit rate and the capacity utilization rate in equilibrium.
Let
 2 
τ d
>0
(23)
λ=− ∗
r dτ
capture the effect of a change in the mark-up rate on the net exports of goods and services
(normalised by the capital stock) at the equilibrium of the economy, where the ratio τ 2 /r∗ is
multiplied for easing up the algebraic manipulation. Since the increase in the mark-up rate
increases the domestic price level and thereby reduces the net exports of goods and services
- because exports fall and imports rise - and the equilibrium profit rate will be positive (for
a viable capitalist economy), we will have λ > 0 as long as the Marshall-Lerner condition
holds.6
To see this, let η = (eP ∗ )/P = (eP ∗ )/ [(1 + τ ) (wb + eP ∗ a0 )] denote the real exchange rate. Hence,
dη/dτ < 0. Then, d/dτ = (d/dη) ∗ (dη/dτ ). Since the Marshall-Lerner condition implies that d/dη > 0,
we see that d/dτ < 0.
6
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Using (22), we see that in equilibrium, the following should be satisfied


φ
− +
+ sr r∗ = I(r∗ , u∗ ).
τ
Differentiating both sides of the above with respect to τ , we get

 ∗  ∗

φ
dr
r φ d
dr∗
du∗
+ sr
−
= Ir
+ Iu
.
+
τ
dτ
τ2
dτ
dτ
dτ
The relationship between the capacity utilization rate given by (17) implies, just as in the
closed economy model, that


du∗
1 dr∗ r∗
= 1+
− 2
dτ
τ dτ
τ
so that,


φ
+ sr
τ



dr∗
−
dτ



r∗ φ d
+
τ2
dτ

Upon rearrangement, we get



dr∗
= Ir
+ Iu
dτ



1
1+
τ



dr∗ r∗
− 2
dτ
τ

r∗
dr∗
=
(φ − Iu − λ)
dτ
Γτ 2


.

(24)

where, I have used (23), and

Γ=
Since

φ
+ sr
τ

du∗
=
dτ





Iu
.
− Ir + Iu +
τ



1 dr∗ r∗
1+
− 2
τ dτ
τ

using (24) and a little algebraic manipulation, we get the impact of a change in the mark-up
rate on the equilibrium capacity utilization rate:



du∗
r∗
1
=
φ + Ir − sr − λ 1 +
.
(25)
dτ
Γτ 2
τ
If g ∗ denotes the growth rate of the capital stock in equilibrium, we have
dg ∗
dr∗
du∗
= Ir
+ Iu
.
dτ
dτ
dτ

(26)

This gives us the main result of the paper.
Claim 2. In a one sector structuralist open economy model with a Steindl-Dutt investment
function, represented by (17), (18), (19), (20), (22), and (21), if the Keynesian stability
condition holds, i.e.

 

φ
Iu
Γ=
+ sr − Ir + Iu +
>0
(27)
τ
τ
12

and if
λ
> sr
(28)
τ
then an increase in the mark-up rate, which leads to an increase in the profit share, causes a
rise in the capacity utilization rate and a rise in the growth rate of the capital stock. Hence,
demand and growth are both profit-led.
Ir + Iu −

Proof. Note that the Keynesian stability condition in (27) implies that
φ > τ Ir + τ Iu + Iu − τ sr .
Hence,

φ − Iu − λ > {τ Ir + τ Iu + Iu − τ sr } − Iu − λ = τ

λ
Iu + Ir − sr −
τ


>0

where the last inequality comes from the condition in (28). Using (24), this shows that
dr∗
> 0.
dτ
Moreover,


1
φ + Ir − sr − λ 1 +
τ





1
> {τ Ir + τ Iu + Iu − τ sr } + Ir − sr − λ 1 +
τ


λ
= (1 + τ ) Iu + Ir − sr −
> 0.
τ



where the last inequality comes from the condition in (28). Using (25), this shows that
du∗
> 0.
dτ
Hence, demand is profit-led.
Using the expression for the derivative of the equilibrium growth rate in (26), this immediately shows that
dg ∗
dr∗
du∗
= Ir
+ Iu
>0
dτ
dτ
dτ
because Ir , Iu > 0. Hence, growth is profit-led.
To understand the intuition for this result, I follow the analysis of the closed economy
model by illustrating the argument in the open economy model using a linear specification
of the Steindl-Dutt investment function in Figure 2. The initial situation of equilibrium
is represented by the intersection of the saving schedule EX and the investment schedule
AB. The equilibrium profit rate is r1 . Starting from a situation of equilibrium, when the
investment schedule rotates clockwise due to a rise in the mark-up rate, the economy need
13

not restore macroeconomic balance at a lower level of investment.7 Instead, macroeconomic
balance can be restored at a higher level of the profit rate where the level of investment
and saving is higher than in the original equilibrium. This is because the saving schedule
shifts up and also rotates in a clockwise direction when τ rises. This can happen because
the intercept of the saving schedule, − , and the slope of the saving schedule, (φ/τ + sr ),
are now responsive to changes in the mark-up rate.8
In the situation depicted in Figure 2, the new investment curve is AB 0 and the new saving
curve is E 0 B 0 , so that the equilibrium profit rate increases from r1 to r2 . At the higher level
of profit rate, investment is higher, and the economy is able to generate the additional
saving to restore macroeconomic balance at the higher level of investment because of the
responsiveness of foreign savings to changes in the domestic mark-up - which is represented
by the vertical shift and the clockwise rotation of the saving schedule. This is precisely
the mechanism that restores the possibility of a profit-led expansion in the open economy
structuralist model. Hence, the corresponding levels of the equilibrium growth rate increase
from OF to OG.
How do we understand the specific conditions given in (27) and (28)? The restrictions in
(27) refers to the Keynesian stability condition. It specifies that the responsiveness of savings
to changes in the profit rate be higher than the responsiveness of investment to the profit
rate. In terms of Figure 2, if this condition holds, it ensures that the investment schedule
intersects the savings schedule from above.
On the other hand the restriction in (28) forces the responsiveness of investment to
changes in the capacity utilization rate, Iu , to be lower than the share of imported intermediate inputs in the marginal cost, φ, after accounting for the change on net exports of final goods
and services (captured by λ). This is because φ − Iu − λ > {τ Ir + τ Iu + Iu − τ sr } − Iu − λ =
τ {Iu + Ir − sr − λ/τ } > 0, where the last inequality follows from (28). Since λ > 0, this
implies that φ > Iu . Hence, this relates to the relative magnitudes of the responsiveness
of the slopes of the saving and investment schedules to changes in the mark-up rate. Note
that the slope of the investment schedule is given by (Ir + Iu + Iu /τ ) so that the responsiveness of this slope to the mark-up rate is −(Iu /τ 2 ). Similarly, the slope of the savings
schedule is given by (φ/τ + sr ), so that its responsiveness to changes in the mark-up rate is
−(φ/τ 2 ). Hence, the condition in (28) imposes the restriction that the responsiveness of the
slope of the savings schedule to changes in the mark-up rate is larger than the corresponding
responsiveness of the slope of the investment function to changes in the mark-up rate. In
addition, the term λ/τ in (28) is the way the model takes account of the fact that changes in
the mark-up rate lead to a vertical shift of the saving schedule, in addition to its clockwise
rotation. Taken together, the condition in (28) imposes the restriction that the joint effect
of the vertical shift and clockwise rotation of the saving schedule should be less than the
effect of the clockwise rotation of the investment schedule on the growth rate. This is also
7
The slope of the investment function is the same as before: z1 + z2 + z2 /τ . Hence, a rise in τ leads to a
fall in the slope.
 2 
d
8
Recall that λ = − rτ∗ dτ
> 0 captures the effect of changes in the mark-up rate on the net exports of
final goods and services at the equilibrium.
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what we see intuitively from Figure 2: if the investment schedule rotated out too far in the
clockwise direction, due a rise in the mark-up rate, the profit-led expansion would not be
possible. One such possibility is depicted in Figure 2 through the investment schedule AB 00 .

4

Conclusion

In this paper, I have revisited the critique of the Steindl-Dutt investment function - where
investment is specified as a function of the profit rate and the capacity utilization rate given in Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). The Bhaduri-Marglin critique suggested that the
Steindl-Dutt investment function imposed unwarranted restrictions and ruled out profit-led
expansion. I have demonstrated that this critique is slightly misplaced.
The problem of using the Steindl-Dutt investment function lies not in the specification
of the investment function itself but in the larger macroeconomic model within which it is
embedded. Most importantly, it is the conjunction of the investment function and the saving
behaviour that jointly impose unwarranted restrictions and rules out profit-led expansion.
While the Steindl-Dutt investment function rules out profit-led expansion in a closed economy model, it does not do so in an open economy model. Therefore, it seems that the key
restrictions come from the saving behavior and not from the specification of the investment
function.

Appendix
In this appendix, I reproduce the argument as developed in Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). The
model refers to a closed capitalist economy without government. Hence, with the classical
savings assumption, the flow of savings comes out of profit income only, so that
S = sr R = sr

R X c
X
X Xc

where S is savings, sr is the average savings rate out of profit income, R is profit income, X
is actual output, and X c is potential (or full-capacity) output. Since the model is about the
short run, X c remains unchanged and can be normalized to 1. Hence,
S = shu

(29)

where h = R/X and u = X/X c refer to the profit share and the capacity utilization rate,
respectively.
Investment is a function of the profit share and the capacity utilization rate, so that
I = I(h, u), Ih > 0, Iu > 0.

(30)

Macroeconomic balance requires the equality of savings and investment, S = I, which
defines the IS curve in the h − u plane as an implicit function
shu − I(h, u) = 0.
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Figure 2: Comparative statics of an increase in the mark-up rate in a one sector open economy structuralist model with a linear specification of the Steindl-Dutt investment function.
The savings function is given by: s(r) = − + (φ/τ + sr ) r; the investment function is given
by g(r) = z0 + (z1 + z2 + z2 /τ ) r. The equilibrium profit rate increases from r1 to r2 and the
corresponding equilibrium growth rate rises from OF to OG.
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The local slope of the IS curve is given by
du
Ih − su
=
dh
sh − Iu
The standard Keynesian stability condition is that savings is more responsive to changes in
capacity utilization than investment, which translates into Iu < sh. This assumption ensures
that the denominator in the expression for the local slope of the IS curve is positive. Hence,
the sign of the slope of the IS curve depends on the sign of the numerator.
When the numerator is negative, i.e. Ih − su < 0, the IS curve is negatively sloped and
the economy is in a stagnationist (wage-led) regime. This is because an increase in the profit
share is associated with a decline in the capacity utilization rate (because the local slope
of the IS curve is negative). When the opposite happens, i.e. Ih − su > 0, the IS curve is
positively sloped and the economy is in an exhilarationist (profit-led) regime. This is because
an increase in the profit share is associated with an increase in the capacity utilization rate.
The analysis in Bhaduri and Marglin (1990, Appendix A) shows that if, instead of (30),
we use the following investment function
I = I(r, u),
which is what Basu and Das (2016) call a Steindl-Dutt investment function, then we will
have
uIu > hIh
(31)
This implies that Ih < (u/h)Iu . If we take the Keynesian stability condition, Iu < sh, and
multiply through by u, we get (u/h)Iu < su. Using this in conjunction with (31), we see
that
Ih < (u/h)Iu < su.
Hence, the Steindl-Dutt investment function rules out the exhilarationist (profit-led) regime,
because such a regime requires that Ih > su.
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